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ABSTRACT 
Social Mobility and Redistributive Taxation    
by Kai A. Konrad and Florian Morath * 
We investigate redistributive taxation in a political economy experiment and 
determine how different patterns of social mobility affect the choices of 
redistributional taxes. In the absence of social mobility, voters choose tax rates 
that are very well in line with the prediction derived in the standard framework 
by Meltzer and Richard (1981). However, past or future changes in the income 
hierarchy affect the choice of the tax rate in the current period. The same is true 
for social mobility within the period to which the tax rate choice applies and for 
the case where the choice of the tax rate takes place behind the veil of 
ignorance. Due to our design of the experiment, these strong effects of own 
social mobility cannot be attributed to social or other-regarding preferences. 
 
Keywords: Median voter, redistribution, social mobility 
 
JEL classification: D72, D78, H20 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Soziale Mobilität und Einkommensumverteilung  
Dieser Artikel untersucht Besteuerung mit dem Ziel der Einkommens-
umverteilung in einem polit-ökonomischen Experiment. Wir ananlysieren, wie 
unterschiedliche Muster sozialer Mobilität die Wahl von Steuern bestimmt, die 
zur Umverteilung dienen. Ohne die Möglichkeit eines sozialen Auf- oder 
Abstiegs entscheiden sich die Wähler für Steuersätze, die der theoretischen 
Vorhersage des Standardmodells von Meltzer und Richard (1981) entsprechen. 
Mobilität in der Einkommenshierarchie – sowohl in der Vergangenheit als auch 
in der Zukunft – hat jedoch einen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Wahl des 
Steuersatzes in der gegenwärtigen Periode. Dies gilt auch, wenn die Möglich-
keit sozialer Mobilität in derjenigen Periode besteht, in der der Steuersatz zur 
Anwendung kommt. Ebenso verändert sich die Wahl des Steuersatzes, wenn 
die Entscheidung hinter dem „Schleier der Unwissenheit“ vorgenommen wird. 
Aufgrund des Aufbaus des Experiments können diese starken Effekte eigener 
sozialer Mobilität nicht durch soziale Präferenzen begründet sein.    
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1 Introduction
What explains the distribution and redistribution of income? This has been
a fundamental question ever since the early days of economics and political
science. Addressing this question, Meltzer and Richard (1981) combined
ideas about the distribution of abilities, income earning incentives and market
forces with political institutions and political decision-making. In this paper,
we investigate experimentally this concept of voting on redistribution, and
we examine how di¤erent patterns of social mobility a¤ect the choices of
redistributional taxes.
The seminal theory developed by Meltzer and Richard (1981) rests on
a concept of rational citizens who maximize their own, narrowly dened
interests. In the economic sphere they choose their own work e¤ort given their
individual abilities and given the regime of redistributional taxation currently
in place. In the political sphere they vote on the regime of redistributional
taxation. Applying median voter theory and assuming that the median voter
anticipates the distortion e¤ects and redistribution e¤ects of a higher tax rate,
Meltzer and Richard predict an outcome in which the tax rate chosen just
balances the marginal benet and cost which an increase of the redistributive
tax have for the median voter. The level of redistribution increases with the
ratio of the mean income in society to the income of the median voter.1
Many further motivations and aspects of wage-earning activities and elec-
toral choices about redistribution have been considered in the three decades
since 1981.2 First, intertemporal considerations and the dynamics of own
income generating ability may play a role. Individuals who are currently
well-o¤ may like to commit to a system of income redistribution if they fear
that they may lose their high income position and become the beneciaries
1In the presence of imperfect insurance markets, however, inequality can have a non-
monotonic e¤ect on redistributive preferences (Bénabou 2000). Moreover, if welfare expen-
ditures are targeted to the poor, inequality negatively a¤ects the support for redistribution
(Moene and Wallerstein 2001).
2See, e.g., Rehm (2009) for a related classication.
2
of this redistribution in the future. Redistribution may then have the role
of insurance for them (Varian 1980). Similarly, currently poor individuals
may favor income redistribution less strongly if they feel that they (or their
children) may rise in the income hierarchy in future periods (Piketty 1995).
Second, preferences about status, positional concerns or other-regarding pref-
erences may be important. There is potentially a large number of motives
behind such preferences. They can be based on feelings of altruism, envy
or other types of relative-standing comparisons.3 Preferences about relative
standing or status may be subject to the prevailing institutional or historical
framework, or norms that have evolved. The willingness to share with others
may depend on the perceptions of social mobility that prevail in a society
(Bénabou and Ok 2001). Third, citizens may have what could be called
"social preferences" about how the distribution of incomes should look like.
Determinants of such preferences may, for instance, be feelings of empathy,
group identity, national identity or solidarity.4 Also, whether individuals
perceive income distribution as a result of individual e¤ort ("merit"), or as
a result of pure chance, may a¤ect their distributional preferences and their
views about redistribution.5 Such motivations may add to, counteract, or
cloud the basic underlying logic of the Meltzer-Richard concept.
In our analysis, we rst ask whether the simple and intuitively compelling
theory of Meltzer and Richard (1981) holds if income earning and voting
3Such considerations have a long history in social science. In economics, relative-
standing comparisons have been recognized by Veblen (1899) and their consequences have
been developed more formally, e.g. by Frank (1984, 1985), Glazer and Konrad (1996),
Fershtman and Weiss (1996), and Fehr and Schmidt (1999), among others.
4The idea of moral sentiments is, evidently, very old in the history of ideas. It has
been given formal consideration, for instance, by Hochman and Rogers (1969). Recent
work by Shayo (2006, 2009) suggests that preferences about redistribution may be linked
to concepts of social or national identity.
5Piketty (1995) analyzes the role of own mobility history for redistributional pref-
erences. His research focuses on the role of beliefs about whether economic success is
predetermined or whether individual e¤ort is more important for economic achievements
for individualspreferences on redistribution. See Isaksson and Lindskog (2009) for an
international comparison.
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on redistribution takes place in an experimental laboratory and under ideal
conditions. In a framework in which the three additional sets of motivations
are absent by construction, we nd: individuals seemingly understand the
structure of the Meltzer-Richard problem, and they behave accordingly. They
follow their material interests when choosing their income-generating e¤orts.
They also understand the consequences of their electoral choices and vote in
line with their material interest. They seemingly can see through the scal
veil of taxation and redistribution and correctly anticipate the consequences
of higher taxes for other individualswork e¤ort, and what this implies for
redistribution. This provides the benchmark and an important reference
point for the second set of questions we ask.
The second set of questions addresses aspects of income mobility and how
income mobility a¤ects voting on redistributional taxes. We compare three
di¤erent mobility regimes to our benchmark case where individuals have a
constant ability/productivity throughout all rounds of the experiment. In the
rst mobility regime, the ability of individuals randomly uctuates from one
round to another, but is known with certainty within one round. Does this
perceived social mobility a¤ect the subjectschoices of the redistributive tax
even if the electoral choice of the redistributive tax takes place each round and
applies only to the current round? In the second mobility regime, when voting
on redistribution, individuals have a signal, but not perfect information about
their productivity at the point in time when income can be earned. Thus,
contrary to the rst mobility regime, there is actual income mobility within
one round of the experiment. In the third mobility framework, the choice of
taxes occurs under a complete veil of ignorance: individuals know the income
distribution in society, but not their own income.
In the rst mobility regime, perceived mobility has an e¤ect on the choices
of the tax rate, and median tax rates are signicantly lower than in the
benchmark case. The same is true for the second mobility regime; here,
under actual social mobility, median tax rates are similar to those in the
4
rst mobility regime under perceived social mobility. In the third mobility
regime, behind a veil of ignorance, we identify two di¤erent types of behavior:
almost one half of the subjects take into account the tax distortion e¤ects
and choose tax rates in line with their material interest; the other half of
the subjects state tax rates that are very close to the average of potentially
optimal future tax rates. By and large, the di¤erent types of mobility have
e¤ects that are in line with narrowly selsh electoral and earnings choices.
Measurement of policy choices on redistributive taxation in countries,
or by questionnaires about preferences for redistribution and the like, have
limits that suggest laboratory experiments as an important complementary
tool. The experimental setup has three important advantages for studying
these questions.
First, it is di¢ cult to identify the Meltzer-Richard logic in the empirical
data, given that it could be clouded by all the other e¤ects discussed above.
In the laboratory, individuals can be placed in a framework in which most
or all aspects that add, counteract or potentially conceal this logic can be
controlled for or removed. We use a simple device for removing all status
considerations and possible types of other-regarding preferences from the
picture.
Second, for the Meltzer-Richard logic to materialize it would be important
for voters to anticipate the equilibrium behavior of the vast majority of other
individuals. The choice of tax rate that maximizes their material payo¤ is,
for instance, lower (higher) if the tax is more (less) distortionary for actual
behavior than what it should be from the perspective of a worker who chooses
his labor supply according to narrowly dened selsh interests. This type
of strategic uncertainty can also be controlled for in the laboratory, by
embedding the subjects in a computer-simulated environment. At the same
time, this setup eliminates any repeated games e¤ects.
Third, for the Meltzer-Richard logic to emerge it is important that the
conditions of the median voter theorem apply. There are numerous rea-
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sons why the median voter outcome need not emerge in the eld, ranging
from standard types of violations of assumptions made for the median voter
theorem (one-dimensional policy space, single-peaked preferences) to issues
such as partiesability to commit, accountability, and candidate competence
issues, voter abstention, expressive voting (Glazer 1987, Huck and Konrad
2005, Feddersen et al. 2009) or other types of non-sincere voting.
Empirical evidence on the Meltzer-Richard (1981) theory is inconclusive.
Neustadt and Zweifel (2009), for instance, nd that Swiss citizensdemand
for redistribution increases with income and higher self-positioning, which
they interpret as being in contradiction with the Meltzer-Richard (1981)
model. Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1999) argue that their calibration model of a
dynamic Meltzer-Richard framework predicts transfers that are "quite close"
to empirical data. Moene and Wallerstein (2003) show that deviations from
the Meltzer-Richard prediction on the impact of inequality can be explained
by distinguishing among di¤erent categories of welfare spending. Given the
large number of aspects that add and potentially obliterate the benchmark
e¤ects, inconclusive evidence should not be surprising.
Existing experimental analyses of income redistribution focus mainly on
other-regarding preferences. Krawczyk (2010), for instance, studies the re-
vealed preferences for redistribution of randomly generated income if indi-
viduals know their mutual probabilities of winning a high income. He nds
that di¤erences in win probability do not lead to stronger preferences for re-
distribution, but that more redistribution was preferred by the subjects if the
win probability was randomly assigned ("luck") than if it was the outcome
of individual e¤ort/ability ("merit"). Similarly, the experiment by Durante
and Putterman (2009) focuses on the role of fairness considerations in a
framework in which players choose redistributional taxes. Further important
experimental work on voting on redistribution has been done by Tyran and
Sausgruber (2006), who analyze a case where subjects endowed with di¤er-
ent income levels vote on a xed amount of redistribution. They nd that
6
Fehr-Schmidt-type inequity aversion may explain their experimental results
on voting on redistribution.
Overall, the empirical and experimental literature suggests that inter-
personal considerations matter for the politics of redistribution. For an ex-
perimental analysis of the motivations underlying the Meltzer-Richard re-
sults, we therefore consider an experimental design which eliminates any
direct fairness considerations and income comparisons from the picture. An
individuals tax choice a¤ects the individuals own income earning e¤ort and
the e¤orts of computer-simulated subjects, but there are no other real sub-
jects in the same experiment the individual could compare with or towards
whom he could develop other-regarding feelings.
2 The setup
The framework that sets out the basis for the experiment follows closely the
model by Meltzer and Richard (1981) - hereafter MR - with simplications
and minor adaptations. Suppose the economy consists of three individuals
who act as voters and workers. Individuals only di¤er in their productivity,
measured by the wage rate wi, where wi 2 f0; 3; 6g.
The distribution of wages within the society is drawn - with equal prob-
ability - from the set P of permutations of the tuple (0; 3; 6). Thus, each
individual has a probability of 1=3 of having a wage of 0, 3, or 6, and the
aggregate wage distribution is the same for all possible random draws. To
allow for social mobility, we assume that the distribution of wages for the up-
coming working period may change after the tax rate has been chosen. This
is the case, for instance, if a tax policy, once implemented, is more sticky
than the distribution of wages. By construction, this allows for individual
income mobility, but the distribution of incomes remains unchanged.
We consider the following two-stage game. At the beginning of stage 1,
one element of P is randomly drawn, and each individual learns his prospec-
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tive wage rate. Then, the individuals simultaneously state their preferred
tax rate  i 2 [0; 1] ; i = 1; 2; 3, knowing that the median choice will be
implemented.6
At the beginning of stage 2, with probability p, a new element of the
set P of possible wage distributions is chosen (possibly identical to the old
one). With the remaining probability 1  p, no reassignment of wages takes
place. (In the basic MR game, p = 0.) If the wage distribution has changed,
individuals learn their new wage rate. In addition, individuals learn the
implemented tax rate. Then, they simultaneously choose their work e¤ort
xi  0; i = 1; 2; 3. The payo¤ of an individual only depends on the nal
wage rate valid in stage 2 and is equal to
i = (1  )wixi   1
2
x2i +
1
2
X
j 6=i
wjxj: (1)
It consists of three terms. First, an individuals gross income is equal to wixi,
and each individual pays a proportional tax  on this income. Second, the
individual bears an e¤ort cost of generating income that rises with his own
work e¤ort and equals 1
2
x2i ; this e¤ort cost is not deductible from the tax base.
Third, the tax revenue is solely used to nance lump-sum redistribution.
More precisely, each individual i receives a transfer that is equal to half of
the tax revenue obtained from taxing the other individuals in his group. Note
that the transfer which an individual receives does not depend on his own
tax payment.7
Given the tax rate  and the nal wage rate wi, maximizing i in (1)
6Compared to the actual political process in a median voter framework, this is a short-
cut which yields the same outcomes as predicted by the median voter theorem. As the
number of voters is uneven, the tax rate is uniquely determined by the median choice.
7This redistribution mechanism makes sure that a player does not internalize any return
on being taxed himself, which is the equivalent to a model with an atomless distribution
of individuals.
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with respect to xi leads to an optimal choice of e¤ort
x (wi) = (1  )wi: (2)
Note that this choice only depends on the tax rate and on the own nal wage
rate, and it is independent of p, since the wage rate is known with certainty
when individuals choose their work e¤ort.
Assuming subgame-perfect play, individuals maximize the expected pay-
o¤ given the choice of work e¤ort x (wi). The optimal choice of the tax rate
depends on the probability p that a new wage distribution will be assigned.
Suppose rst that p < 1: Then, the individual that originally had been as-
signed the low wage w = 0 always prefers a strictly positive tax rate as it is
most likely that his nal wage will be zero. The individual with the prospec-
tive wage w = 3 prefers a strictly positive tax rate whenever his income is
not higher than the mean income in the society.8 The individual, however,
that originally had been assigned the high wage w = 6 always prefers a tax
rate of zero. The reason is as follows. With probability 1  p, the individual
keeps the high wage rate and prefers that there is no redistribution. With
the remaining probability, there is an equal chance of obtaining either of the
three possible wage rates; the optimal tax rate in this case is the one that
maximizes expected surplus which, due to the tax distortion e¤ects, is a tax
rate of zero. With the same argument, if p = 1 and the prospective wage
becomes irrelevant, all individuals prefer a tax rate of zero.
When determining his preferred tax rate, the median voter trades o¤ the
increase in redistribution with the higher tax distortion. His preferred tax
rate is decreasing in p: the more likely it becomes that a new wage distribution
will be assigned, the more important becomes the tax distortion e¤ect when
his expected payo¤ is maximized.
8If the three possible wages are wl < wm < wh, then  (wm) > 0 if and only if
w2m <
 
w2l + w
2
h

=2. Note that w2m <
 
w2l + w
2
h

=2 is fullled if wm  wh=2.
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If p = 0 (as in the basic MR game), the individualspreferred tax rates9
are equal to
  (w = 0) =
1
2
,   (w = 3) =
1
3
, and   (w = 6) = 0: (3)
If p = 0:75 (as we will choose in the experiment), this results in optimal tax
rates
  (w = 0) =
1
4
,   (w = 3) =
1
8
, and   (w = 6) = 0: (4)
With social mobility, the preferred tax rate of both the individual with the
low and the medium wage are lower than in the basic game. For p = 1,
the choice of the tax rate takes place behind the veil of ignorance; all three
individuals prefer a tax rate of
  = 0: (5)
Here, as discussed above, maximization of expected payo¤ corresponds to
maximization of total expected surplus.10
3 Experimental design
The design of the experiment isolates, on the one hand, the e¤ect of the
individual income position on preferences for redistribution and identies, on
9Note that in the equilibrium of the two-stage game, the tax rates chosen by the low and
the high-wage individual are not uniquely determined, as they will not be implemented
as long as they do not constitute the median choice. The notion "preferred tax rate"
corresponds to the tax rate that, if implemented, maximizes an individuals monetary
payo¤, given that all individuals choose the payo¤-maximizing e¤ort in (2).
10Expected income (or its generalized version -expected utility- where the marginal
utility is not constant across levels of income) is generally accepted as an objective by
economists. However, as Rawls has argued, if the choice of the tax rate takes place behind
the veil of ignorance, voterspreferences would represent fair opinions on redistribution,
and he favoured a maximin social welfare function in this case. If voters indeed have
maximin preferences, this would lead to a tax rate equal to the preferred tax rate of the
voter with the low wage ( = 1=2).
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the other hand, the impact of perceived and actual own individual mobility
on preferred tax rates. In the treatments with mobility, the change of own
wage does not change the general wage distribution - by construction. The
focus here is on the impact of (changes of) the votersrelative income position
within the society. In a sense, whereas one could imagine that the income
level of, e.g., the middle class relative to the high-income class could also
change, we have in mind a situation where there is always a low-income,
a middle-income and a high-income class with xed (relative) wage rates,
but exogenous shocks may change individualsa¢ liation with either of these
classes.
To have voting choices from individuals with low, middle and high wages,
we grouped players into sets consisting of 3 voters: one with a low wage rate,
one with a medium wage rate and one with a high wage rate. Only one
of the three players in each set is a realplayer; the co-players in this set
are simulated by the computer. This was made common knowledge. Also,
subjects knew that each simulated player maximizes his own monetary payo¤.
This approach eliminates the possible e¤ects stemming from other-regarding
preferences; in addition, it removes any strategic uncertainty about the co-
players e¤ort choices for a given tax rate and therefore allows for precise
predictions about the behavior of ones co-players in a given set.
Each of the treatments consisted of 24 groups, each with one real player
and two simulated players. One session consisted of 12 rounds. The base(line)
treatment implements the framework of Meltzer and Richard (1981) setting
p = 0: individuals know their wage with certainty when choosing the tax
rate. Each individual was randomly assigned a wage rate at the beginning of
the experiment, and the individuals knew that they would keep their wage
rate throughout the entire experiment. Thus, the one-period voting game
was played 12 times, each time with the same wage rate and the same wage
distribution within a group.
The second treatment, the Rand(om) treatment, is designed to identify
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the e¤ect of past experience and future income mobility on preferences for
redistribution, focusing only on "perceived mobility" and abstracting from
"actual mobility". Here, again p = 0, that is, individuals kept their wage
rate within a round; they were, however, randomly assigned a new wage
rate in each of the 12 rounds. The stage game therefore is identical to the
stage game in the Base treatment; rounds are completely independent, and
there is no uncertainty about the individual income position within a given
round. But in the Rand treatment, individuals experienced di¤erent wage
rates in the past, and anticipated di¤erent income positions in the future.
The theory predictions for this treatment are precisely the same as for the
Base treatment. However, this "perceived mobility" may already a¤ect the
voterspreferences for redistribution.
In the third treatment, theMobi(lity) treatment, we add the possibility
of actual social mobility prior to a possible adjustment of the tax rate. As in
the Rand treatment, individuals obtain a new randomly chosen wage rate in
each new round. In addition, with probability p = 0:75, wages are reassigned
once the individuals have stated their preferred tax rate and before choosing
their work e¤ort.
The last treatment, called Igno(rance), focuses entirely on the aspect
of uncertain future income by assuming that individuals learn their wage
rate only after having decided on the tax rate. (From a theory perspective,
this corresponds to p = 1 in the game above.) As there is perfect income
mobility, this is equivalent to the choice of taxes taking place behind the veil
of ignorance.
Table 1 summarizes the design of the experiment. The experiment was
programmed and conducted with the experiment software z-Tree (Fischbacher
2007) and run at the MELESSA lab of the University of Munich. The sub-
jects (96 in total) were students from a large variety of elds of study.11 Earn-
ings in the experiment were measured in a currency called "Taler". Before
11The participants were recruited using the software ORSEE (Greiner 2004).
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Treatment Description # rounds # groups
Base(line)
Subjects keep wage
throughout experiment
12 24
Rand(om)
Subjects randomly get
new wage each round
12 24
Mobi(lity)
Subjects get new wage
within round with prob. 3
4
12 24
Igno(rance)
Subjects learn wage only
after choice of tax rate
12 24
Table 1: Experimental design
the experiment started, the subjects had to answer questions regarding their
understanding of the experiment; by answering the questions, they earned
an endowment of 10 Taler. The exchange rate used in all treatments was 6
Taler = 1 Euro.
Each of the four treatments consisted of 12 rounds. At the beginning of
each round (except for the Igno treatment), the subjects were informed of
their wage in this round and remembered the wages of their co-players. In
the Mobi treatment, it was indicated that, in 3 out of 4 cases, a new wage
distribution would be assigned. Subjects were asked to state their preferred
tax rate in percentage, as an integer between 0 and 100. The preferred tax
rates of the two simulated voters within a group were chosen as to maxi-
mize the players monetary payo¤ (this was commonly known). The nite
number of rounds rules out possible repeated game e¤ects for equilibrium
play if players are motivated by material interests only. However, such ef-
fects may emerge nevertheless. We consider such e¤ects as very unlikely in
our environment, because subjects knew that they interact with independent
computer-simulated players in each round, and these computer-simulated
players maximize monetary payo¤s in each single round.
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The computer selected the tax rate that was implemented in this round.
With a probability of 0:8, the computer selected the median choice, and with
the remaining probability, the computer selected either the lowest or the
highest of the three proposed tax rates within a group. This ensured that
the individuals with low or high wage would have an (economic) interest to
honestly state their preferred tax rate. The way the computer would select
the tax rate implemented for the group was explained in the instructions.12
At the beginning of the second stage, the subjects learned the imple-
mented tax rate, and, in treatments Mobi and Igno, their (possibly new)
wage. They had to choose their work e¤ort as a real number between 0 and 6.
At this point, the subjects were shown a cross table, computing for di¤erent
possible choices of e¤ort their gross income, the taxes they would have to pay,
and their cost of e¤ort. For the two simulated voters, the computer chose
their payo¤-maximizing work e¤ort. At the end of each round, subjects were
displayed their own preferred tax rate, the tax rate selected for their group,
their own work e¤ort, and their own monetary payo¤ in this round.
4 Theoretical predictions
Building on the theoretical framework, we rst derive predictions on the
subjects voting behavior and e¤ort choices in each treatment. Then, we
compare the Base treatment (where subjects keep their wage throughout
the entire experiment) to the treatments with (perceived) social mobility.
The rst two hypotheses focus on behavior within a given treatment. We
predict that the observed e¤ort choices are in line with the theory prediction
given by (2).
12Note also that this deviation from the strict median voter framework does not a¤ect
the equilibrium choices of work e¤ort in the theoretical framework in section 2, as work
e¤ort is always chosen once the actual tax rate is known.
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Hypothesis 1 (E¤ort choice) In all treatments, the choice of work e¤ort
is equal to the theoretically predicted equilibrium e¤ort.
Next, we predict that material interest drives the choice of the tax rate
in the sense that preferred tax rates are strictly decreasing in the wage rate.
Moreover, focusing on the choices of the median voter, we predict that median
tax rates correspond to the theory prediction given in (3) for the Base and
theRand treatment and in (4) and (5) for theMobi and the Igno treatment,
respectively. The median voterschoices are most reliable as they are most
likely the tax rates being selected within the group. Still we will discuss the
choices of voters with low or high wage and compare them to the theoretically
optimal choices.
Hypothesis 2 (Preferred tax rates) a) In the treatments Base, Rand,
and Mobi, the preferred tax rate is strictly decreasing in the wage rate.
b) In all treatments, the median voters tax rate is equal to the theoretically
predicted choice.
In the Base and the Rand treatments, subjects know their wage when
they choose the tax rate, and therefore risk preferences do not play any
role. In the Mobi and the Igno treatment, however, the subjectspreferred
tax rates may depend on how subjects react to uncertainty. If we expect
the subjects to exhibit (strong) risk aversion, median tax rates in the two
latter treatments would be higher than the theory prediction in (4) and
(5), respectively. For this reason, Hypothesis 2b may be rejected for the
Mobi and the Igno treatment, but instead the preferred tax rates may be
higher than the theory prediction made under the assumption of risk-neutral
subjects.13 In particular, this could explain the occurrence, contrary to the
theory prediction, of tax rates above zero in the Igno treatment.
13Risk aversion is usually dened as a willingness to sacrice expected income in ex-
change for a reduction in variance. In lotteries with small stakes (compared to the present
value of lifetime income) such behavior cannot be explained well by the von-Neumann-
Morgenstern utility theory. As has been discussed also in the context of experimental
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In addition to the hypotheses on behavior within a given treatment, we
can derive predictions on the impact of (perceived) social mobility on voting
behavior and state hypotheses on di¤erences of behavior across treatments.
Let us rst compare the Rand treatment to the Base treatment. As the
game in each round is exactly the same in these two treatments, from a
theory point of view, behavior should not di¤er. Moreover, rounds are fully
independent, and it is explained that the assignment of the wage rate is
perfectly random. As subjects decide in a computer-simulated environment,
they cannot establish a relation between their current choice and their co-
playersfuture choices. Thus, theory predicts that median tax rates in the
Base and the Rand treatment should be the same.
In the Rand treatment, however, subjects experience being in either of
the roles, which is the only di¤erence with respect to the Base treatment.
This "perceived mobility" may a¤ect their behavior. If there is an e¤ect
of perceived mobility, then median tax rates should be lower in the Rand
treatment than in the Base treatment: if subjects are not strongly risk-
averse, perceived mobility might result in a reaction similar to the one in
the Mobi treatment. The perceived randomness might cause median voters
to take the tax distortion e¤ect better into account and to choose lower tax
rates.14
Hypothesis 3 (Rand vs. Base) a) In the Rand treatment, the median
voters choice of the tax rate is the same as in the Base treatment.
b) (Counterhypothesis "perceived mobility e¤ect") In the Rand treatment,
the median voters preferred tax rate is lower than in the Base treatment.
economics, the von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is approximately linear for vari-
ations of lifetime incomes in a range of 20 Euro, suggesting locally risk-neutral behavior.
Nevertheless, individuals seemingly exhibit risk aversion also with respect to such "small"
lotteries in laboratory experiments, which can possibly be explained by rank-dependent
utility and other deviations from expected utility.
14Changing the roles throughout the experiment might also lead to a better identication
with the poor (and the rich) subject and therefore strengthen the median voters "sense of
justice/fairness". However, as co-players are simulated, such considerations are eliminated
in our experiment.
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Past experience may help to identify e¤ects of perceived mobility. In ad-
dition to a possible impact of the wage in the previous period on preferred tax
rates, we can test whether perceived upward mobility (having become richer)
or perceived downward mobility (having become poorer) a¤ects behavior.
Next, we analyze the e¤ect of actual social mobility by comparing the
Mobi treatment to the Base treatment. Here, we predict that, due to the
possibility of obtaining a new wage in the same round, i.e., for the then xed
tax rate, the median voters preferred tax rate is lower in theMobi treatment
than in the Base treatment.
Hypothesis 4 (Mobi vs. Base) In the Mobi treatment, the median voters
preferred tax rate is lower than in the Base treatment.
Strong risk aversion could diminish or even reverse this di¤erence, because
the median tax rate in the Mobi treatment is higher the stronger the risk
aversion. Moreover, risk aversion would imply that voters who have a high
wage when choosing the tax rate would prefer a higher tax rate than voters
with a high wage in the Base treatment.
Finally, the Igno treatment incorporates the e¤ect of choices taking place
behind the veil of ignorance. We expect preferred tax rates in the Igno
treatment to be lower than the median tax rates in the Base treatment,
since the consideration of the tax distortion e¤ect should be stronger in the
Igno treatment, where in fact all voters are median voters.
Hypothesis 5 (Igno vs. Base) Preferred tax rates in the Igno treatment
are lower than the median tax rates in the Base treatment.
Preferred tax rates in the Igno treatment may di¤er from predicted be-
havior, for a number of reasons. Risk aversion could matter, resulting in
higher preferred tax rates. Also, choices could express maximin preferences
which would result in preferred tax rates being equal to the optimal choice
of the voter with the low wage. Further, if experience of previous rounds
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matters in the Igno treatment, we may observe an impact of a subjects
wage in the previous round.
5 Estimation results
To analyze the results of the experiment, we proceed in three steps. First,
we estimate the subjectschoices of work e¤ort as a function of tax rate and
wage. Second, we identify the impact of the wage on preferred tax rates.
Third, we examine in more detail the median voterschoices of the tax rate
to determine the impact of social mobility on median tax rates. Before we
turn to the estimation results, Table 2 provides an overview of the average
preferred tax rates in the four treatments.
In Table 2, preferred tax rates of the di¤erent types of individuals are
calculated both using all data and, in order to control for learning e¤ects,
using only data from late periods.15 If we focus on experienced behavior, in
the Base treatment the average preferred tax rate of voters with the low
wage is equal to 65:1% and thus higher than the theory prediction of 50%;
the average choice of voters with the median tax rate is 32:8% and thus very
close to the theoretically predicted choice of 33%. The average preferred tax
rate of voters with the high wage (3:3%) is slightly higher than the predicted
choice of 0%: In the Rand treatment, average choices of individuals with
low or high wage are similar to the Base treatment, but the median tax
rate, 20:5%, is much lower, indicating that perceived mobility clearly seems
to matter.
In the Base and the Rand treatment, the tax rates strictly decrease with
the wage. This is less obvious in the Mobi treatment. Here, in particular
for the voters with medium or high wage, tax rates are higher than the
theoretically predicted ones. Finally, in the Igno treatment, where voters
15Standard errors are adjusted using the "cluster"-option in STATA in order to control
for non-independence of observation within the same group.
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Average preferred tax rates
Base Rand Mobi Igno
All periods
Pred. Obs. Pred. Obs. Pred. Obs. Pred. Obs.
w = 0 50
73.4
(6.5)
50
63.9
(6.6)
25
31.2
(4.7)
-
w = 3 33
34.6
(4.5)
33
23.9
(2.8)
12.5
22.2
(3.2)
-
w = 6 0
4.6
(1.8)
0
6.3
(1.5)
0
23.2
(3.8)
-
Avg. 0
19.9
(3.1)
Experienced behavior
Pred. Obs. Pred. Obs. Pred. Obs. Pred. Obs.
w = 0 50
65.1
(8.2)
50
67.4
(6.7)
25
31.5
(6.1)
w = 3 33
32.8
(3.4)
33
20.5
(2.9)
12.5
24.5
(5.0)
w = 6 0
3.3
(1.5)
0
4.2
(1.7)
0
23.6
(4.0)
Avg. 0
22.7
(4.2)
Note: Tax rates in percentage. Standard errors adjusted for clusters in
parentheses. Experienced behavior: data from rounds 7  12.
Table 2: Summary of experimental results
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did not know their wage when choosing the tax rate, the average preferred
tax rate is 22:7% and hence clearly above zero, which would be the optimal
choice of risk-neutral individuals.
The predictions on the preferred tax rates are based on the assumption
that voters choose their payo¤-maximizing e¤ort in stage 2 of the game.
Therefore, before examining the preferences on tax rates, we estimate the
voterswork e¤ort as a function of their wage and the implemented tax rate.
Work e¤ort Theory predicts an e¤ort choice equal to xit = (1   it)wit,
where  it is the (known) tax rate chosen in group i and round t; wit is subject
is (known) wage in round t. Hence, (1   it)wit equals subject is net wage.
Let Treat be a vector that contains a variable equal to 1 for all observa-
tions and, in addition, dummy variables for the treatments Rand, Mobi,
and Igno. We estimate the work e¤ort in stage 2 in a random e¤ects model
according to the equation
xit = Treat +  (1   it)wit Treat+i+"it
where  and  are vectors, and i is the individual specic random e¤ect.
By interacting the net wage with the vector Treat, we allow for treatment-
specic intercepts.
Table 3 summarizes the results of two separate estimations of the work
e¤ort. The rst estimation uses data from all periods, while the second
estimation uses only observations from the second half of the experiment.
The coe¢ cients 1 to 4 measure the work e¤ort chosen by individuals with
a wage of zero, and the coe¢ cients 1 to 4 determine the impact of the net
wage on e¤ort choices.
The constant 1 estimates the average work e¤ort of voters with a wage
of zero in the Base treatment, which, although being small, is signicantly
positive in the rst estimation, but no longer signicantly di¤erent from zero
if we account for learning e¤ects (experienced behavior). The coe¢ cients 2
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Work e¤ort
Estimated equation
xit= Treat+ (1   it)witTreat+i+"it
Estimation results All periods Experienced behavior
1 (constant)
0.252
(0.117)
0.146
(0.133)
2 (Rand)
0.047
(0.150)
0.079
(0.171)
3 (Mobi)
-0.135
(0.152)
-0.032
(0.176)
4 (Igno)
0.007
(0.151)
0.026
(0.171)
1 ((1   it)wit) 0.965

(0.042)
0.991
(0.048)
2 ((1   it)witRand) 0.060(0.048)
0.004
(0.057)
3 ((1   it)witMobi) 0.012(0.047)
-0.014
(0.056)
4 ((1   it)witIgno) -0.035(0.045)
-0.052
(0.053)
R2 (overall) 0.863 0.884
N 1152 576
Note: () signicant at 1% (5%). Standard errors in parentheses.
Experienced behavior: data from rounds 7-12.
Table 3: Estimation results for e¤ort choices
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Work e¤ort
Estimated equation
xit= Treat+ (1   it)witTreat+i+"it
Hypothesis testing All periods Experienced behavior
H0 : 1 = 1 p = 0:405 p = 0:854
H0 : 1 + 2 = 1 p = 0:314 p = 0:889
H0 : 1 + 3 = 1 p = 0:289 p = 0:426
H0 : 1 + 4 = 1 p < 0:001 p = 0:007
H0 : 1 + 2 = 0 p = 0:002 p = 0:036
H0 : 1 + 3 = 0 p = 0:229 p = 0:322
H0 : 1 + 4 = 0 p = 0:007 p = 0:113
Note: Experienced behavior: data from rounds 7-12. HO tested by means of
two-tailed Wald tests.
Table 4: Hypothesis testing for e¤ort choices
to 4 control for treatment di¤erences with respect to the Base treatment;
none of these coe¢ cients is signicantly di¤erent from zero.
More importantly, there is a strictly positive impact of the net wage on
work e¤ort in the Base treatment (measured by 1). Again, we do not
nd treatment e¤ects (no signicance of 2 to 4). Thus, the choice of
work e¤ort does not di¤er across treatments. The results in Table 3 already
show that the impact of an increase in the net wage is close to one, which
would be the theoretically predicted impact. To test whether the observed
behavior is exactly in line with the theory prediction (Hypothesis 1), we
perform additional tests summarized in Table 4.
The rst set of tests in Table 4 demonstrates that, in all but the Igno
treatment, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the marginal e¤ect of the net
wage on work e¤ort is equal to one. Even in the Igno treatment this impact
is close to one. Second, the test results show that, in the Rand treatment
(and in the Igno treatment considering all periods), subjects with a wage
of zero have, on average, chosen a signicantly positive work e¤ort (test in
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rows 5 and 7 in Table 4). These "mistakes" do not occur very often; in 90%
of the cases, a work e¤ort of zero has been chosen, and, under experienced
behavior, 21 out of the 24 subjects in the Rand treatment chose zero e¤ort
whenever they were assigned the low wage.
Result 1 The voterschoices of the work e¤ort are almost perfectly in line
with the theory prediction (Hypothesis 1). We do not nd statistically signif-
icant di¤erences among treatments.
The fact that observed e¤ort choices are very close to the theoretically
predicted choices is an important nding. It suggests that, in the absence
of other-regarding preferences, voters correctly anticipate the distortionary
e¤ects of redistributive taxes.
Preferred tax rate To estimate the subjectspreferred tax rates, we
use a random e¤ects estimation similar to the one above. We estimate the
preferred tax rate  it of subject i in round t as a function of the wage wit
and interaction terms of wit with dummies for the di¤erent treatments. Since
theory predicts an individuals preferred tax rate to be a non-linear function
of the individuals wage rate, we include the squared wage rate w2it into the
regression and estimate subject is preferred tax rate  it in period t as
 it = Treat + wit Treat + w2it Treat + i + "it
where the vector Treat again contains a variable equal to 1 for all observa-
tions as well as treatment dummies for Rand, Mobi and Igno. Again, i
corresponds to the individual specic e¤ect.
Table 5 presents results for two estimations, the rst using all data and
the second using data only from rounds with experience. Similar to the
regression of e¤ort choices, the coe¢ cients 1 to 4 determine the voters
average preferred tax rate in case of w = 0, and 1 to 3 together with 1
to 3 capture the impact of the wage on the voterschoices. As in the Igno
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Preferred tax rate
Estimated equation
 it = Treat + wit Treat + w2it Treat + i + "it
Estimation results All periods Experienced behavior
1 (constant)
73.365
(5.053)
65.104
(6.079)
2 (Rand)
-10.573
(6.054)
1.993
(7.320)
3 (Mobi)
-42.310
(6.071)
-34.850
(7.375)
4 (Igno)
-53.458
(5.835)
-42.410
(7.020)
1 (wit)
-14.392
(4.294)
-11.274
(5.166)
2 (witRand) -1.745(4.646)
-6.684
(5.711)
3 (witMobi) 10.326

(4.664)
8.980
(5.758)
4 (witIgno) - -
1 (w
2
it)
0.487
(0.688)
0.163
(0.827)
2 (w
2
itRand) 0.647(0.744)
0.996
(0.917)
3 (w
2
itMobi) -0.041(0.747)
0.052
(0.922)
4 (w
2
itIgno) - -
R2 (overall) 0.421 0.399
N 1152 576
Note: Tax rates in percentage. (,) signicant at 1% (5%,10%). Standard
errors in parentheses. Experienced behavior: data from rounds 7-12.
Table 5: Regression results for preferred tax rates
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treatment there is no wage e¤ect, 1+4 identies the average preferred tax
rate in this treatment.16
More in detail, 1 estimates the average tax rate preferred by voters with
a low wage in the Base treatment, and 2; 3 and 4 identify deviations for
the other three treatments. The choices of the low-wage types in the Rand
treatment are signicantly di¤erent from the Base treatment only if we
consider all periods (compare 2). In the Mobi treatment, however, voters
with the low wage choose a much lower tax rate than in the Base treatment
(3). For the Igno treatment, the sum of 1 and 4 measures the average
preferred tax rate (over all types), which is equal to 19:9% considering all
periods and 22:7% focusing on experienced behavior. Both this average tax
rate in the Igno treatment and the preferred tax rates of low-wage types in
the other treatments are higher than predicted by theory (compare Table 2).
Now consider the impact of the wage. As 1 shows, there is a signicantly
negative e¤ect of the wage rate on preferred tax rates in the Base treatment.
Moreover, 2 and 2 indicate that there is no signicant di¤erence between
the Base and Rand treatments. In the Mobi treatment, however, the
marginal e¤ect of the wage on tax rate choices is signicantly weaker, at
least if we consider all periods (3).
17
Table 6 tests whether the impact of the wage in treatments Rand and
Mobi is di¤erent from zero. In the Rand treatment, there is a signicant
impact of both wit and w2it on preferred tax rates (rows 1 and 3 in Table 6).
In fact, here the preferred tax rate is a decreasing and convex function of the
wage.18 In the Mobi treatment, the impact of wit is signicantly negative
only if we consider all periods (row 2 in Table 6), and there is no signicant
16Since in the Igno treatment subjects dont know their wage when they choose the tax
rate, the interaction terms with the wage are omitted.
17In another estimation, we included the subjectswage in the previous round (wi;t 1)
interacted with treatment dummies into the estimation. None of these variables has a
signicant impact (with the exception of wi;t 1Rand which is signicantly positive at the
10%-level if we consider all periods); all results on the other coe¢ cients remain unchanged.
18The slope is equal to 2 + 22w, which is indeed strictly decreasing for all w 2 [0; 6].
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Preferred tax rate
Estimated equation
 it = Treat + wit Treat + w2it Treat + i + "it
Hypothesis testing All periods Experienced behavior
H0 : 1 + 2 = 0 p < 0:001 p < 0:001
H0 : 1 + 3 = 0 p = 0:026 p = 0:367
H0 : 1 + 2 = 0 p < 0:001 p = 0:004
H0 : 1 + 3 = 0 p = 0:126 p = 0:598
Note: Experienced behavior: data from rounds 7-12. HO tested by means of
two-tailed Wald tests.
Table 6: Hypothesis testing for preferred tax rates
e¤ect of w2it (row 4). The average preferred tax rate of the high-wage type is
almost the same as the average preferred tax rate of the medium-wage type
(compare Table 2).19 This may be explained by the relatively large degree of
mobility (wages reassigned with probability 75%), as average tax rates are
similar to the average tax rates in the Igno treatment.
Result 2 Preferred tax rates are strictly decreasing in the wage rate in treat-
ments Base and Rand, conrming Hypothesis 2a). In the Mobi treatment,
the e¤ect of the wage rate on preferred tax rates is only weak.
To test Hypothesis 2b on the median voterspreferred tax rates and Hy-
potheses 3-5 on intra-treatment e¤ects, we run a further regression including
only median voterschoices. For the Rand and the Mobi treatments, we
model past mobility by adding a variable containing the di¤erence between
actual wage and previous wage,wit = wit wi;t 1, interacted with treatment
dummies. If wit is positive, this expresses upward mobility (the individual
has become richer), and wit < 0 expresses downward mobility. For the
Igno treatment, where subjects do not know their actual wage, we include
19Controlling for outliers, this also holds for the choices of voters with a low wage.
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wi;t 1 into the estimation. Here, contrary to the other three treatments, all
observations are included in the estimation, since all voters can be considered
as median voters.
We estimate a linear regression of the form
 it = Treat+2witRand+3witMobi+4wi;t 1 Igno+ "it
where Treat contains a variable equal to 1 for all observations as well as
dummies for Rand, Mobi and Igno.20 The estimation results are shown
in the rst part of Table 7, while the second part of Table 7 tests whether
median voters behavior in the four treatments is in line with the theory
prediction.
First, consider the estimation results in the rst part of Table 7. In
the Base treatment, the average preferred tax rate of the median voter
(measured by 1) is equal to 35:2% (32:75% if we consider only experienced
behavior) and therefore close to the predicted choice of 33%. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, however, there is a signicant treatment e¤ect (2) if we introduce
perceived social mobility: even if the game is exactly the same in each round
and rounds are clearly independent, median tax rates in the Rand treatment
are about 12% lower than in the Base treatment.
For the treatment e¤ect in the Mobi treatment (coe¢ cient 3), learning
does play a role. The point estimate as well as the signicance level di¤er
in the two estimations in Table 7; overall, actual social mobility leads to
tax rates that are lower than in the Base treatment. The same is true for
the Igno treatment where learning seems to be important and tax rates
are about 15% (10% under experienced behavior) lower than in the Base
20We control for possible non-independence of observations by clustering the standard
errors on individual level (using the cluster option provided by STATA). If we estimate
a random e¤ects model, the results are similar, but partly depend on whether or not we
include the observations of the Igno treatment into the estimation; this suggests that the
assumption of the random e¤ects model on the variance of the individual specic e¤ects
may not hold.
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Median tax rate
Estimated equation
 it= Treat+2witRand+3witMobi+4wi;t 1Igno+"it
Estimation results All periods Experienced behavior
1 (constant)
35.239
(4.667)
32.750
(3.430)
2 (Rand)
-11.630
(5.507)
-12.264
(4.526)
3 (Mobi)
-14.335
(5.458)
-9.121
(5.544)
4 (Igno)
-15.671
(5.379)
-10.918
(5.104)
2 (wit Rand) -0.942(0.809)
-0.046
(1.025)
3 (witMobi) -1.428(1.038)
-1.162
(1.720)
4 (wi;t 1  Igno) 0.232(0.583)
0.282
(0.602)
R2 (overall) 0.063 0.032
N 516 281
Hypothesis testing All periods Experienced behavior
H0 : 1 = 33 p = 0:633 p = 0:942
H0 : 1 + 2 = 33 p = 0:002 p < 0:001
H0 : 1 + 3 = 12 p = 0:002 p = 0:009
H0 : 1 + 4 = 0 p < 0:001 p < 0:001
H0 : 2 = 3 p = 0:508 p = 0:552
Note: Tax rates in percentage. () signicant at 1% (5%). Standard errors in
parentheses. Experienced behavior: data from rounds 7-12. HO tested by means
of two-tailed Wald tests.
Table 7: Regression results and hypothesis testing for median tax rates
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treatment.
Second, let us examine in more detail the point estimates of the median
voters preferred tax rate. Rows 1-4 in the second part of Table 7 report
the results of testing Hypothesis 2b on the exact values of the observed
choices. First, we cannot reject that 1 = 33, that is, we cannot reject that
median voters in the Base treatment behave exactly according to the theory.
Implementing the logic of Meltzer and Richard (1981) in its purest form, we
observe median tax rates that are fully in line with the theory. Adding
di¤erent notions of social mobility, however, leads to signicantly di¤erent
voting behavior. This holds even if there is no actual social mobility between
tax rate choice and earnings decisions: in the Rand treatment, median tax
rates are signicantly lower than predicted. This is one of the key results of
our paper, and we discuss its implication in the conclusion.
In the Mobi and the Igno treatment, the median voters preferred tax
rate is signicantly higher than the theory prediction. One explanation for
this result could be risk aversion, since in the latter two treatments the choice
takes place under uncertainty.21
Result 3 Hypothesis 2b on median tax rates cannot be rejected for the Base
treatment. In the Rand, Mobi, and the Igno treatment, median tax rates
signicantly di¤er from the theory prediction.
As shown in the estimation results in Table 7, the perception of social
mobility seems to have an important impact on the votersdecisions. Since
perceived social mobility leads to lower tax rates, perceived downward mo-
bility does not cause an upward adjustment of tax rates, but instead the
21We also run non-parametric tests on group means (being dened as average chosen
tax rate within a group, i.e. per subject). The results are exactly the same: we cannot
reject that the median tax rate in the Base treatment is equal to 33%, but we can reject
in the other treatments that subjects behave exactly according to theory. Moreover, the
tests suggest that preferred tax rates of voters with low or high wage di¤er from the exact
theory prediction, with two exceptions: preferred tax rates of high-wage types in theMobi
treatment and in the Base treatment do not signicantly di¤er from the theory prediction
(where in the latter case this only holds under experienced behavior).
29
perception of upward mobility dominates. With respect to past experience
measured by wit, the estimated coe¢ cient 2 is negative, implying that
subjects that have become richer tend to choose lower tax rates. This co-
e¢ cient, however, is not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Thus, in addition
to the negative treatment e¤ect of the Rand treatment, there is no further
signicant impact of past experience.
Result 4 The median tax rates in the Rand treatment are signicantly
lower than in the Base treatment. This rejects Hypothesis 3a and provides
evidence in favor of Hypothesis 3b on the role of perceived social mobility.
As discussed above, for theMobi treatment there is a negative treatment
e¤ect only if we include all periods into the estimation. Nevertheless, aver-
age preferred tax rates of the median voter are considerably lower than in
the Base treatment. Introducing actual social mobility within a round does
a¤ect average choices, although the variance of preferred tax rates is large.
Interestingly, comparing the treatment e¤ects of the Mobi and the Rand
treatment, we do not nd a signicant di¤erence (last row in Table 7). In the
Rand treatment, there is only perceived social mobility (possibly di¤erent
wages experienced in the past, or anticipated for rounds some time in the
future) whereas in theMobi treatment, actual social mobility is added: sub-
jects obtained a new wage in each round, which could again change within
the round, after the tax rate was chosen. There is, however, no additional
e¤ect of adding actual social mobility to perceived social mobility, suggest-
ing that the entire e¤ect of social mobility has already been captured in the
Rand treatment.22 While the lower preferred taxes in case of actual mo-
bility are in line with payo¤-maximizing rational behavior, the similarity of
the e¤ects of perceived mobility (Rand) and actual mobility (Mobi) is more
22Again, we run non-parametric tests on group means to compare average behavior
across treatments. All results are conrmed. We nd a signicant treatment e¤ect of both
the Rand and the Mobi treatment, but we do not nd a signicant di¤erence between
median tax rates in the Rand and the Mobi treatment.
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di¢ cult to interpret. Subjects may follow a simple heuristic ("intuition",
"gut feeling") that tells them that lower tax rates are better for them in the
presence of income mobility. Such a heuristic as a choice rule performs very
well compared to a full optimization program in an empirical environment
in which the sequencing of changes of income and tax rates typically is not
as deterministic and less clear-cut than in the two treatments. Subjects may
have adopted this heuristic in such a more natural environment. Instead of
solving the specic optimization problem at hand, they may have used this
heuristic in all instances of income mobility.23
Result 5 The median tax rates in the Mobi treatment are (weakly) signif-
icantly lower than in the Base treatment, conrming Hypothesis 4. Median
tax rates in the Rand and the Mobi treatment do not di¤er signicantly.
Finally, we nd that, behind the veil of ignorance, choices of the tax rate
are signicantly lower than in the Base treatment. Thus, voters take into
account the tax distortion e¤ect. Tax rates are, however, also signicantly
higher than predicted by theory. Furthermore, we do not nd a signicant
impact of the wage in the previous round (4). We will conclude the empirical
analysis of our results by examining in more detail the choices made behind
the veil of ignorance.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of tax rates that each single individual
in the Igno treatment chose on average. (Recall that in total there are 24
subjects in this treatment.) An interesting pattern evolves in the histogram.
It basically identies three groups of subjects. A rst group, of about 42%
of the subjects, chose on average a tax rate below 10%, the mean of this
group being a tax rate of 4:78%. A second group, involving about 54% of the
subjects, chose a tax rate between 20% and 40%. The average choice within
23Work by psychologists (see, e.g., Gigerenzer 2007) suggests that heuristics play a major
role governing human behavior. Whether or not heuristics or some other factors explain
the similarity in tax rate choices in the two mobility treatments would have to be explored
in a separate analysis.
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Figure 1: Distribution of average tax rates in the Igno treatment
this group is equal to 28:46%: A third group which, in fact, consists of only
one subject, chose an average tax rate of 60%.
The choice of the rst group is, although positive (4:78%), close to the
theory prediction of a tax rate of zero.24 Thus, the decisions of this group of
subjects take into account the tax distortion e¤ects; risk aversion does not
a¤ect this choice of the tax rate. The majority of subjects, however, chose a
higher tax rate which is between the median voterschoice of the tax rate in
the Base and the Rand treatment. Only one subject chose a much higher
tax rate; this choice is similar to the preferred tax rates of voters with the
low wage in the Base and the Rand treatment and could thus be considered
as expressing maximin preferences.
Another interpretation of the behavior of the second group can be given if
one remembers the situation in which individuals decide: they have to choose
a tax rate knowing that they will end up with either a low, a medium, or a
high wage. If they knew their wage, they would optimally choose a tax rate
of 50%; 33%; and 0%; respectively. Their actual choice under uncertainty
24As shown in Table 2, in the Base treatment individuals with a high wage chose a
similar tax rate (on average 4:6%) even if a zero tax rate is predicted by theory.
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(28:46% on average) is almost exactly equal to the average of the three po-
tentially optimal tax rates (which would be 27:67%). This may suggest that
a large part of individuals employs a simple - but wrong - heuristic when
deciding on the tax rate: they simply choose the average of the tax rates
they would prefer in the three possible outcomes of the wage assignment.
Result 6 The average preferred tax rate in the Igno treatment is lower than
in the Base treatment, but higher than theoretically predicted. Two di¤erent
types of behavior can be identied: one part of the subjects choose tax rates
close to the theory prediction, and another part of the subjects choose tax
rates close to the average of the tax rates that would be optimal if subjects
knew their wage.
6 Conclusion
The seminal theory of Meltzer and Richard (1981) provides an important
concept for redistributive taxation in a context of political decision-making:
material interests determine the choice of redistributive taxes, taking into ac-
count incentive e¤ects of higher taxes on individual work e¤ort. To identify
this logic in empirical studies, however, is di¢ cult, due to the many factors
that may cloud the picture and that cannot easily be controlled for. The
laboratory creates an environment in which most of these additional factors
can be removed or controlled for. Indeed, implementing the Meltzer-Richard
logic in its purest form in a laboratory experiment shows that the individuals
understand the consequences of decisions on redistributive taxation and vote
in line with their material interest. In our baseline treatment, where the
individualsproductivity was known and xed throughout the experiment,
voting decisions were driven by individual productivity and the subjects cor-
rectly anticipated the incentive e¤ects of higher taxes. The median voters
choice of the tax rate was almost perfectly in line with the theory prediction
of Meltzer and Richard.
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As soon as factors other than individual productivity become relevant,
the voterschoices may change. In three further treatments, we examined
the consequences of individual social mobility as one of the very important
factors that inuence preferences for redistribution and that can be identi-
ed in the laboratory. We considered three di¤erent regimes of individual
income mobility. In the rst regime, the setup in each single round was ex-
actly as in the baseline treatment implementing Meltzer-Richard, with the
only exception that in each round individual productivity was randomly as-
signed and thus changed during the experiment. With this "perceived social
mobility", material interest still determined the choices of redistributive tax
rates. However, even though the rounds were completely independent, the
median voters tax rate was signicantly lower than in the baseline treat-
ment, suggesting that perceived social mobility - i.e. a history of changes in
own wage in the past and prospects of changes in own wage in the future -
causes preferred tax rates to be lower.
In a second mobility regime, we added actual social mobility: when decid-
ing on redistributive taxation, the individuals only had an imperfect signal
about their actual productivity in a given round and learned their actual
productivity only after the tax rate was chosen. As a consequence of this
income mobility, median tax rates were lower than in the baseline treatment,
but they did not di¤er from the rst mobility regime where productivity only
uctuated between rounds.
In the third mobility regime, individuals did not know their income posi-
tion when deciding on taxation. Two major types of behavior emerged: one
part of the individuals chose tax rates close to the theory prediction, taking
into account disincentive e¤ects from taxation; a second group of subjects
chose tax rates close to the average of potentially optimal tax rates.
In all treatments, we embedded the subjects in an environment where the
co-players were simulated by computers. This largely removed the individ-
ualsstrategic uncertainty regarding the distortionary e¤ect of taxation on
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their co-playerswork e¤ort and enables us to focus on choices of redistribu-
tive taxes. More importantly, it creates an environment that can identify the
driving forces in the Meltzer-Richard framework and the role of social mobil-
ity in a framework in which other-regarding preferences or social preferences
have no relevance. As a key result, we nd that both perceived and actual
individual social mobility matter for the choice of tax rates and induce the
median wage earners to choose lower taxes. These results would be in line
with some of the theories of other-regarding preferences or with preferences
about an equitable income distribution in a society. Interestingly, however,
these e¤ects emerge here even though other-regarding preferences or social
preferences can be ruled out as possible explanations; there is no room for
social preferences if the society consists of only one real player, who is teamed
up with two computerized players. These observations are important for the
interpretation of earlier ndings on preferences for redistribution and social
mobility. The results hint at possible di¤erent explanations for these ndings.
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Instructions for the Mobi treatment1
General Information
 Please read these instructions carefully and completely.
 Please do not talk to your neighbors and keep quiet during the entire experiment.
 Raise your hand if you have a question. One of us will come to you.
 All participants in the experiment have been given the same instructions.
Introduction
 In this experiment you will repeatedly make decisions. By doing so you can earn money.
 Your gains are measured in Talers. How much you earn depends on your decisions.
 At the end of the experiment your total sum of Talers will be determined by an initial en-
dowment plus the number of Talers you earned in each round.
 At the end of the experiment you will receive 1 euro in cash for every 6 Talers. In addition,
each participant will receive a participation fee of 4 euros.
 During the entire experiment, anonymity among participants and instructors will be kept.
 The experiment consists of 12 rounds.
 Before the experiment starts, we will ask you several questions via your computer screen which
refer to possible situations in the experiment. For each question that you answer, you will
earn one Taler. The funds earned after answering the questions will constitute your initial
endowment.
Description of the experiment
 In this experiment, you can earn income by expending work e¤ort. Your income will depend
on the amount of work e¤ort and on your wage per unit of work e¤ort.
Your work e¤ort will be measured by the number of units of e¤ort you choose to expend.
You will choose the units of work e¤ort in each round of the experiment.
Your wage per unit of work e¤ort will be assigned to you by the computer. Your wage
rate can be either low (0 Taler per unit of e¤ort), medium (3 Taler per unit of e¤ort),
or high (6 Taler per unit of e¤ort).
You will be randomly assigned your wage rate at the beginning of each round of the
experiment.
 Your income from work e¤ort will be higher the more units of e¤ort you choose to expend.
Your entire income from work will be subject to a tax. The collected tax revenues will be
redistributed among the participants of the experiment.
1The experiment was conducted in German. The translated instructions for the Mobi treatment subsume the
instructions for the other treatments, which are a shortened form of this version.
A-1
 Each unit of work e¤ort carries a cost. The work e¤ort cost is higher the more units of e¤ort
you choose to expend. This cost will be subtracted from your after-tax income (i.e. your
income minus your tax payment).
Setup of the experiment
 In each round, three participants of the experiment will form a group.
 In each group, there will be exactly one participant with a low wage, one participant with a
medium wage and one participant with a high wage per unit of work e¤ort.
 In the experiment, the two co-players in your group are not real participants of the experiment.
Instead, the roles of the two co-players in your group will be performed by computers. The
computer decides regarding the roles of the two other co-players, so that the gains of those
two players will be highest.
 At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly assigned a wage rate. Henceforth, it will
be randomly decided at the beginning of each round whether you will receive a low, medium
or high wage per unit of work e¤ort.
 Each round consists of two stages:
 In the rst stage, each participant states his preferred tax rate.
After having stated your tax rate, you will be assigned a new wage rate in 3 out of 4
cases (that is, with a probability of 75%). This new wage rate will be again either low,
medium or high, and it will again be randomly assigned. It can, but need not di¤er from
your initial wage rate.
 In the second stage, each participant chooses how much units of work e¤ort he wants to
expend. At the end of each round, the number of Talers you have earned in this round
will be displayed.
The following section describes the two stages of the experiment in greater detail.
Stage 1: Choice of the tax rate
 During the experiment, three participants form a group. The roles of the two co-players in
your group will be performed by computers.
 In each group, there will be one participant with a low wage rate, one participant with a
medium wage rate and one participant with a high wage rate.
 All three participants simultaneously state a tax rate that they would like to implement in
their group. You choose the tax rate as an integer between 0 and 100; the number between 0
and 100 corresponds to the percentage of your income that has to be paid as tax.
 The computer then compares the three proposed tax rates within a group.
 In most cases, the computer will select the median of the three proposed tax rates for all
members of the group.
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For example, if the proposed three tax rates within a group are 7%, 25% and 30%, the
computer would implement a tax rate of 25% for all members of the group.
 In case the proposed three tax rates within a group are 18%, 64% and 65%, the tax rate
for the group would be 64%.
Note that the chosen tax rate will not be the average proposed tax rate, but the median
proposed tax rate.
 In some cases, the computer will select the lowest of the three proposed tax rates or the
highest of the three proposed tax rates for all members of the group.
 If the members of a group propose tax rates 1, 2 and 3 where tax rate 1 will be the lowest,
tax rate 2 the median and tax rate 3 the highest of the three proposed tax rates the selection
by the computer will be as follows:
 In 8 out of 10 cases (i.e. with a probability of 80%): Tax rate 2 will be selected
In 1 out of 10 cases (i.e. with a probability of 10%): Tax rate 1 will be selected
In 1 out of 10 cases (i.e. with a probability of 10%): Tax rate 3 will be selected
 At the beginning of stage 2, all members of the group will be displayed the selected tax rate.
This tax rate will be applied for each participant of the group.
 The selection of the tax rate takes place separately for each group.
 After having chosen a tax rate, you will be assigned a new wage in 3 out of 4 cases (that is,
with a probability of 75%).
 If you are assigned a new wage rate, you can obtain either a low, a medium, or a high wage
per unit of work e¤ort.
 If you are assigned a new wage rate, the two co-players in your group will also be assigned
a new wage rate.
 In any case, there will always be exactly one participant with a low wage rate, one
participant with a medium wage rate and one participant with a high wage rate in your
group.
Stage 2: Choice of work e¤ort
 At the beginning of stage 2, all members of the group will see the selected tax rate on their
display.
 In case your wage rate has changed, you will be informed via your computer screen, and you
will be shown your new wage per unit of work e¤ort.
 All participants simultaneously choose the work e¤ort they want to expend. The amount of
work e¤ort is chosen as a number between 0 and 6. By expending more units of work e¤ort,
you are able to earn more income.
 Each additional unit of work e¤ort carries a cost which is subtracted from your after-tax
income. Thus, more work e¤ort also involves a higher cost.
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 Finally, your prot will be determined during this round. Your prot depends on your work
e¤ort, the work e¤ort of the co-players in your group, and the selected tax rate.
 Keep in mind: If your wage rate has changed between the rst and the second stage, your
prot will only depend on the wage rate that is valid in the second stage.
The following section describes how your prot is calculated.
Calculation of your prot
 Your prot is determined by the following elements:
Your income from work e¤ort
minus your tax payment
minus your cost of work e¤ort
 plus a transfer income that is nanced by the tax payments of the two co-players in your
group.
 Your income from work e¤ort depends on your work e¤ort and on your wage rate. The
payment of taxes is not yet considered within your income from work e¤ort.
The wage rate of each participant can either be low, medium, or high. A low wage rate
has a value of 0 Taler per unit of work e¤ort, a medium wage rate has a value of 3 Talers
per unit of work e¤ort, and a high wage rate has a value of 6 Talers per unit of work
e¤ort.
You will choose by yourself the units of work e¤ort in each round. Your wage rate will
be assigned to you by the computer.
 If your wage rate has changed between the rst and the second stage, your prot will
only depend on the wage rate assigned in the second stage.
Your income from work e¤ort is calculated by multiplying the wage rate by the number
of units of work e¤ort expended:
Income from work = wage per unit of work e¤ort  units of work e¤ort
In the following table, your income from work e¤ort is calculated for di¤erent decisions on
how much work e¤ort you choose to expend. Please note that the units of work e¤ort may
be chosen as any possible number between 0 and 6.
Number of units of work e¤ort 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Income from work e¤ort for a low wage rate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Income from work e¤ort for a medium wage rate 0 3 6 9 12 15 18
Income from work e¤ort for a high wage rate 0 6 12 18 24 30 36
 The amount of taxes you will have to pay will be determined by the tax rate valid for your
group.
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Your tax payment is calculated by multiplying your income from work e¤ort by the tax
rate:
Tax payment = tax rate  income from work e¤ort
= tax rate  wage rate  work e¤ort
 The units of work e¤ort you choose to expend create a cost, which is subtracted from your
income after taxes. This cost is calculated as follows:
 You will receive a transfer income that is nanced by the tax payments of the co-players in
your group. Each participant receives a transfer income equal to half of the tax payments of
the two other group members:
Transfer income = 0,5  tax payments of the two co-players
= 0,5  tax rate  income from work e¤ort of the two co-players
 Altogether, your prot in one round is determined as
Prot = income from work e¤ort
  tax payment
  cost of work e¤ort
+ transfer income
Sequence of actions in the experiment
 Each group in this experiment consists of three participants.
 In each group, there will be exactly one participant with a low wage rate, one participant
with a medium wage rate and one participant with a high wage rate.
 In the experiment, the two co-players in your group will be simulated by computers.
 In stage 1, the computer chooses a preferred tax rate for each of your co-players. This
happens simultaneously to your choice of a preferred tax rate.
Then, one of the proposed tax rates will be selected as the tax rate valid for your group
in this round.
Afterwards, the computer will choose the units of work e¤ort for each of your co-players.
The computer decides regarding the roles of your two co-players so that the gains of
those two players will be highest.
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 In each round, you and your co-players will be assigned a new wage rate.
 At the beginning of each round, your wage rate will be displayed.
 Afterwards, you will state the tax rate that you would like to implement for your group in
this round. You will have to enter your preferred tax rate in the corresponding text eld and
conrm this choice by clicking the OKbutton.
 The computer chooses the tax rate out of the three proposed tax rates within a group (your
preferred tax rate and the preferred tax rates of your co-players). In most cases, the computer
will select the median of the three proposed tax rates, but in some cases, the computer will
select the lowest or the highest of the three proposed tax rates.
 After having chosen a tax rate, you will be assigned a new wage rate in 3 out of 4 cases (that
is, with a probability of 75%).
 Then, the tax rate to be implemented in your group in this round will be displayed. If your
wage rate has changed, you will be informed by the computer and shown your new wage rate.
 Each participant then chooses his work e¤ort. You will have to enter your work e¤ort in the
corresponding text eld and conrm this choice by clicking the OKbutton.
 Please note: As additional information, the computer will display a table in which the follow-
ing elements are calculated for di¤erent choices of work e¤ort you can make: resulting income
from work e¤ort, resulting tax payment, resulting cost of work e¤ort. Your transfer income
will depend on the work e¤ort expended by the co-players in your group.
 At the end of each round, you will be shown the following information:
 own proposed tax rate
 selected tax rate for your group
 units of work e¤ort you expended
 your prot in this round
The following gure summarizes the sequence of actions in one round.
 Before the experiment starts, we will ask you several questions via your computer screen
which refer to your actions in the experiment. By answering the questions, you can earn your
initial endowment.
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